Abstract
Abstract
Public reason liberals hold that laws and institutions must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Public reason liberals have developed different accounts of the constituency of reasonable citizens to whom justification is owed. Recently, a number of theorists have suggested that public reason views with less “sectarian” accounts of reasonableness are in one way better than public reason views with more “sectarian” accounts of reasonableness. Yet despite being used to tremendous effect to motivate particular theories of public reason, this anti-sectarianism desideratum has not received focused treatment, and hardly any detailed arguments have been offered for it. In this paper, I fill this gap by considering the case for the anti-sectarian desideratum. I find that there is no good reason to regard less sectarian public reason views as in one way better than more sectarian views.
Reference32 articles.
1. Ackerman, Bruce. Social Justice and the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980.
2. Arneson, Richard. “Rejecting The Order of Public Reason.” Philosophical Studies 170, no. 3 (2014): 537–44.
3. Billingham, Paul. “Liberal Perfectionism and Quong’s Internal Conception of Political Liberalism.” Social Theory and Practice 43, no. 1 (2017): 79–106.
4. Billingham, Paul, and Anthony Taylor. “A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories.” European Journal of Political Theory (forthcoming).
5. Chan, Joseph. “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29, no. 1 (2000): 5–42.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?;The Philosophical Quarterly;2023-03-28
2. Global public reason: too thick or too thin;Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy;2023-03-24