Author:
Mesquita Bruce Bueno De,Lalman David
Abstract
Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
65 articles.
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1. Inhalt;Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft;2023-07-06
2. Frontmatter;Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft;2023-07-06
3. Tabellenverzeichnis;Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft;2023-07-06
4. Abbildungsverzeichnis;Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft;2023-07-06
5. Literaturverzeichnis;Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft;2023-07-06