Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement, and Politics in Rawls

Abstract

The intention of this essay is to raise certain questions about A Theory of Justice in Rawls's own terms—accepting his premises but examining his reasoning by his own stated criteria. I believe that such an examination will show that the abstract justificatory appeal to an “original position” is unsatisfactory in certain vital psychological and philosophical ways; that the Rawlsian analysis raises problems of comparison and measurement not adequately disposed of by the doctrine of justice as fairness and its corollary strategy of “maximin”; and that the appeal to congruence on which the latter part of Rawls's argument depends is founded on an inadequate political and historical sociology—which in turn creates further problems for the argument from the original position. In sum, I wish to show that while Rawls has lit his candle at both ends, he has got neither end to burn.