Politics and interests in the classical gold standard. Spain (1876-1913)

Abstract

Spain never formally joined the classical gold standard, partly because its aspiration for gold convertibility did not match the financing needs of the Treasury. This paper illustrates how preferences for convertibility, that is, for fixed exchange rates, were shared by the parliamentary representatives of its manufacturing provinces because of their dependency on imported inputs (coal and cotton). However, to explain their preference for currency stability, trade policy must be considered. Without the high tariffs that the cotton industry enjoyed thorough the whole period and the steel industry from 1891 onwards, the renouncement of a procompetitive depreciating peseta might not have been so clear-cut. Thus, beyond the Spanish case, this paper supports the theoretical assumption that the input-output structure of a productive sector influences its currency stance, while reinforcing the argument that trade policy plays a key role in the understanding of currency politics.