Partisan alignment and public policies provision in Brazil

Abstract

Abstract This research examines whether local governments politically aligned with the president’s party offer more public policies. The delivery of public services is one of the central activities of governments. Since the political parties control the executive branch in both federal and local government, it is reasonable to expect that their partisan and electoral interests will influence policy implementation. This study analyzes the coverage of primary healthcare as an indicator of policy delivery. Given the strong sharing of responsibilities among federated entities, I argue that the federal government implements public policies strategically, increasing the supply of services in partisan-aligned municipalities. To empirically test this relationship, I estimate the causal effect of alignment using a regression-discontinuity design for close elections. The results indicate that partisan-aligned municipalities have, on average, 3% higher coverage of primary healthcare than others governed by opposition parties. In a city with 10,000 inhabitants, for example, this would mean 300 more people receiving healthcare.