Affiliation:
1. Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil
Abstract
Abstract This article examines oversight over foreign policy-making by the Brazilian National Congress, specifically whether the use of oversight tools at their disposal by Senators and Deputies conform to the ‘fire alarm’ or ‘police patrol’ models. This is done by recording and analysing requests for information and summonses to ministers filed in the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate between 1991 and 2014, especially those directed at the Ministry of Foreign Relations. We also compare the use of these instruments in respect of foreign policy to their use in respect of other portfolios. Lastly, analysing the content of these requests and summonses leads to interesting conclusions about how these instruments are used politically, notably in terms of the government-opposition ideological divide.
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