Co-sponsorship networks in the Brazilian Congress: An exploratory analysis of Caucus influence

Abstract

Abstract A defining characteristic of the Brazilian Congress is the informal self-organization of legislators from different parties into issue-specific caucuses, known as bancadas. Though not official entities and often loosely delineated, these groups many times play central roles in proposing and approving or blocking legislation. Presidents often negotiate directly with the more influential caucuses instead of going through formal political parties. Caucuses can thus have great influence on public policy, both as a locus of lobbying and rent-seeking or as means of representation and governability. In this paper we use network theory to measure the links between legislators using the co-sponsorship of proposed bills. The analysis identifies and ranks the main caucuses and provides a measure of their influence and power. The networks that emerge from these exercises show that, at least at the level of co-sponsorships, caucuses can provide a better description of the legislators’ behavior and interaction than political parties.