Mystical experiences without mysticism: An argument for mystical fictionalism in psychedelics

Abstract

Abstract Mystical experiences frequently precede decreases in human suffering or increased functioning. Therapies that include the ingestion of psychoactive substances in supportive environments often lead to improvements that correlate with the magnitude of the mystical experiences generated. A close look at these phenomena from a philosophy of science perspective might put empiricists in a quandary. Arguments with critics of the import of these mystical experiences, prohibitionists, or others who are apprehensive about psychedelic-assisted treatments, might prove awkward or difficult given the tacit assertion that the mystical genuinely exists. The assumption might even dampen theorizing in ways that remain outside of theorists' awareness. The predicament might lack the epistemic humility ideal for good science as well. Nevertheless, abandoning the construct of mystical experiences would require ignoring compelling, replicated empirical work. We argue that a version of philosophical fictionalism that draws on research in logic and linguistics can help investigators engage in this discourse without implying a belief in the mystical. Comparable approaches have proven helpful in mathematics and empiricism more broadly. Mystical fictionalism could help theorists view reports of mystical experiences as true even if the mystical fails to be veridical. The approach creates an expressive advantage that could assist researchers and theorists eager to refine our understanding of mystical experiences and improve psychedelic-assisted treatments. Mystical fictionalism might also inspire novel looks at correlates of mystical experiences that might serve as mediators of their effects, potentially generating models with comparable explanatory power that sidestep the need for a fictionalist approach.