Cell types as species: Exploring a metaphor

Abstract

The concept of “cell type,” though fundamental to cell biology, is controversial. Cells have historically been classified into types based on morphology, physiology, or location. More recently, single cell transcriptomic studies have revealed fine-scale differences among cells with similar gross phenotypes. Transcriptomic snapshots of cells at various stages of differentiation, and of cells under different physiological conditions, have shown that in many cases variation is more continuous than discrete, raising questions about the relationship between cell type and cell state. Some researchers have rejected the notion of fixed types altogether. Throughout the history of discussions on cell type, cell biologists have compared the problem of defining cell type with the interminable and often contentious debate over the definition of arguably the most important concept in systematics and evolutionary biology, “species.” In the last decades, systematics, like cell biology, has been transformed by the increasing availability of molecular data, and the fine-grained resolution of genetic relationships have generated new ideas about how that variation should be classified. There are numerous parallels between the two fields that make exploration of the “cell types as species” metaphor timely. These parallels begin with philosophy, with discussion of both cell types and species as being either individuals, groups, or something in between (e.g., homeostatic property clusters). In each field there are various different types of lineages that form trees or networks that can (and in some cases do) provide criteria for grouping. Developing and refining models for evolutionary divergence of species and for cell type differentiation are parallel goals of the two fields. The goal of this essay is to highlight such parallels with the hope of inspiring biologists in both fields to look for new solutions to similar problems outside of their own field.