Author:
Yao Nan,Tan Xiwen,Zhang Yuefan,Qu Yunhan,Han Xue,Li Zhi
Abstract
With the rapid development of economy and the improvement of people's living standard, the domestic waste is greatly increasing. Based on the multi-agent evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model among the recycling industry, urban management officer and government is established to address the environmental issues of rising municipal solid waste production and low recycling utilization rates in China. Through numerical example analysis, the relationship between relevant factors on the evolutionary stable state of the system is studied. The findings demonstrate that when the likelihood of severe oversight by the government and of significant enforcement by urban management officers grows, the recycling industry becomes more ready to select waste separation strategy. Additionally, the government is far more affected by the likelihood of significant enforcement by urban management officers than the recycling industries are. In addition, effective acceleration of waste sorting may be achieved by giving the recycling industries the proper government subsidies and increasing the recycling industries' profits from garbage sorting. Moreover, the government's increased fines for the urban management officers can significantly lower the incidence of bribery between the recycling industries and the urban management officers.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Subject
Public Administration,Urban Studies,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
Cited by
1 articles.
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