Moral and Intellectual Virtues: On the Relation between Detached Contemplation and Political Prudence

Abstract

The classical Aristotelean distinction between moral and intellectual virtues has come to us as one of the first explicit conceptualizations of a realm of knowledge and a realm of action. This paper intends to analyze the meaning of that distinction according to an alternative hypothesis, namely, that the moral and intellectual virtues correspond to a profound understanding of the relation between the philosophical and the political life. The analysis will be guided by the relatively unclear relation between phrónesis and sophía, and by the subtle but remarkable differences that Thomas Aquinas introduces in his systematization of virtues, e.g., his explicit flight from this life as the goal of contemplation. Aquinas’ understanding of theoría or contemplation will shed light on the basis of Aristotle’s concern with virtues—the tension between philosophy and politics that must be mediated by a resourceful prudence.