Affiliation:
1. CRNC, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Abstract
The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated
against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analysing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside of philosophy can be successfully evaluated
against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework.
Subject
Artificial Intelligence,Psychology (miscellaneous),Philosophy,Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Mental strength: A theory of experience intensity;Philosophical Perspectives;2023-11-07
2. Introspection Is Signal Detection;The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science;2021-05-05