Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments
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Published:2023-08-01
Issue:7
Volume:30
Page:88-111
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ISSN:1355-8250
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Container-title:Journal of Consciousness Studies
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language:en
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Short-container-title:Journal of Consciousness Studies
Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
Abstract
A dominant approach to conceptualizing a role for emotions in practical agency has been to focus on a relation between emotions and reasons, whereby emotions are claimed to track reason-giving considerations via their intentional content. Yet, if we reflect on the phenomenology of emotional
consciousness and take seriously a growing consensus that emotions involve intentional feelings then, I argue, such a reason-tracking approach at best only provides part of the story and at worst is fundamentally misguided. This does not mean that emotion has no role in practical agency, however.
I tentatively propose that the normative category of commitments offers a promising alternative for thinking about the role of emotions in practical agency, an alternative that has the potential to do justice to intentional feelings while avoiding the problems of a reason-tracking approach.
Publisher
Imprint Academic Ltd
Subject
Artificial Intelligence,Psychology (miscellaneous),Philosophy,Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics