Provably Secure Linearly Homomorphic Aggregate Signature Scheme for Electronic Healthcare System

Abstract

In recent years, deploying Internet of Things (IoT) in electronic healthcare systems (EHS) has made great progress in healthcare detection. It is extremely important to reduce the cost of communication and ensure the authenticity and integrity of data. A linearly homomorphic signature scheme can solve the above problems. However, when the scale of EHS is too large, the transmission, storage and verification of signatures need a high cost. An aggregate signature can combine many signatures generated by many different users into a short one. Therefore, only one aggregate signature needs to be processed during verification, transmission and storage. Combining the advantages of aggregate signature and linearly homomorphic signature, this paper proposes an aggregate signature scheme based on a linearly homomorphic signature for EHS, which has both linear homomorphism and aggregation, and realizes double data compression. Moreover, our scheme can resist a potential real attack, named a coalition attack. The security of this scheme is rigorously demonstrated based on the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.