Author:
Cheng Kuang-Feng,Tsai Chien-Shu,Hsu Chu-Chuan,Lin Szu-Chung,Tsai Ting-Chung,Lee Jen-Yao
Abstract
This paper establishes a cross-industry pollution externality model. To explain a benevolent government, it may be possible to tax part of the welfare gains and use the revenue to compensate the affected polluted industry for the damage cost, thereby improving welfare. We show that the social welfare under emission tax with production subsidy is higher than the results of emission tax without production subsidy. The welfare of the polluted sector under emissions trading will be lower than the results of unbalanced budget environmental policy with subsidy. The welfare of the polluted labor union under lobby for compensation will be higher than the results of environmental policy with subsidy if the pollution damage and the weight on political contributions are sufficiently high.
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development
Cited by
3 articles.
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