Abstract
Cache side channel attacks extract secret information by monitoring the cache behavior of a victim. Normally, this attack targets an L3 cache, which is shared between a spy and a victim. Hence, a spy can obtain secret information without alerting the victim. To resist this attack, many detection techniques have been proposed. However, these approaches have limitations as they do not operate in real time. This article proposes a real-time detection method against cache side channel attacks. The proposed technique performs the detection of cache side channel attacks immediately after observing a variation of the CPU counters. For this, Intel PCM (Performance Counter Monitor) and machine learning algorithms are used to measure the value of the CPU counters. Throughout the experiment, several PCM counters recorded changes during the attack. From these observations, a detecting program was implemented by using these counters. The experimental results show that the proposed detection technique displays good performance for real-time detection in various environments.
Subject
Fluid Flow and Transfer Processes,Computer Science Applications,Process Chemistry and Technology,General Engineering,Instrumentation,General Materials Science
Cited by
20 articles.
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