Affiliation:
1. School of Economics and Management (Tourism), Dalian University, Dalian 116622, China
2. School of Public Administration and Humanities and Arts, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China
Abstract
In view of the principal–agent relationship between local government and pollution enterprise in environmental governance, this paper established a multitask principal–agent model, gave the optimal contract form of local government incentive to enterprises, examined the influencing factors of the optimal incentive contract, and focused on analyzing the influences of institutional factors, enterprise types and enterprise attributes on the optimal incentive contract. The results show that the optimal incentive contract is affected by the influence coefficient of enterprise economic benefits on local government revenue, the environmental index weight in government performance systems, the types of enterprise, the risk preference of enterprise, the variance in economic benefits, the variance in pollution emission reduction, the ability of economic benefits, the direct cost of emission reduction and the economic cost (income) of emission reduction. In order to realize the coordinated development of economy and environment, the establishment and adjustment of optimal incentive contract should be established or adjusted according to the institutional factors, different types of enterprise, and the enterprise characteristics. Local governments should divide enterprises into traditional enterprises and green innovative enterprises in the process of management. The policy formulation of the local government should be based on the characteristics of the system and cooperate with the national strategy. Local governments should actively collect and master the attribute information of the enterprises, including risk preference, profit model, pollution control technology and ability, management experience and level, production mode and green innovation ability. Local governments should combine the types of enterprises, the characteristics of institutions and the attributes of enterprises, and adjust various policies and measures more flexibly.
Funder
Humanities and Social Science Project of Ministry of Education of China
National Social Science Fund of China
Dalian Federation of Social Sciences Foundation Key Project
2022 Innovation and Entrepreneurship Training Program for College Students of Dalian University
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development,Building and Construction
Reference23 articles.
1. Incentive Model for Third-Party Remediation of Legacy Contamination Sites left by Closed Enterprises from the Perspective of Fully Linked Accountability;Xu;Syst. Eng. Theory Pract.,2014
2. Huang, R., and Gao, M. (2022). Research on Evolutionary Game Model of the Third-Party Governance of Environmental Pollution considering Incentive Mechanism of Reward and Punishment Distribution. China Environ. Sci.
3. Research on Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Effect of “Monitoring Key Pollution Sources”: Also on the Information Communication Path Optimized by Decentralized Environmental Governance;Zhong;West Forum,2022
4. On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control;Dasgupta;Rev. Econ. Stud.,1980
5. Environmental Policy under Imperfect Information: Incentives and Moral Hazard;Xepapadeas;J. Environ. Econ. Manag.,1991