Research on Optimization of Public Opinion Supervision Model of Social Network Platform Based on Evolutionary Game

Abstract

Network environments have recently emerged as a considerable research area. In addition to government supervision, platform supervision is also critical to improve network environments. So, we should improve the social network platform’s single regulatory model. Against this background, we described public opinion supervision as a game between marketing accounts, netizens, and the platform. Unlike previous studies, we considered the influence of marketing accounts on online public opinion. Because of the players’ bounded rationality, we built an evolutionary game model, and by solving it, we obtained the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Then, we analyzed the influence of relevant parameters on the evolutionary stable state. Our research results show that if the authenticity of the information is not high, to not publish is the best choice for the marketing account, and to not participate is the best choice for the netizen. The platform penalty for the marketing account is also directly related to the marketing account’s decision making. The platform penalty for the government, as well as the increase in the penalty risk coefficient, considerably affected the choice of platform. Finally, we put forward the “pre-event–in-the-event–post-event” three-stage supervision model, which provides countermeasures and suggestions for all parties to jointly maintain the network environment.