Capacity Analysis of Incentive Schemes in Opportunistic Networks

Abstract

Many incentive schemes address the selfishness issue in opportunistic networks and show performance improvement by simulations. However, the insights of incentive schemes that affect network performance are not clear. Network capacity analysis can reveal how factors affect performance, which is a guideline for new designs. To analyze incentive schemes, a well-defined mathematical model is necessary, which cannot be achieved by existing analytical models based on empirical formulas or types of incentive schemes. First, this paper proposes such a model to show the incentive degree with the incentive scheme, cooperation degree, energy usage, buffer usage, and security based on a quantum game model. Verification compares the model with delivery ratios that show impacts on selfish nodes in simulations under two typical incentive schemes. Then, network capacity is analyzed with this model and a sparse clustering regime that has similar mobility to opportunistic networks in order to show factors for future designs.