Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Ca’Foscari University of Venice, Sestiere Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy
Abstract
The notion of decisive coalitions of voters with different grades of decisiveness is a part of the mathematical framework for many models in social choice theory. More generally, we study aggregation problems in which a subgroup of decision makers have the right to determine the properties of the aggregate. Then, we introduce property spaces and rights to properties and characterize aggregation operators that are consistent with rights to properties. Moreover, we define congruences in property spaces, and we propose a generalization of the Sugeno integral in our framework.
Subject
General Mathematics,Engineering (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
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