Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Wisconsin Stevens Point, Stevens Point, WI 54481, USA
Abstract
Leibniz’s jurisprudence and theory of natural law, which began development as early as the 1660s, has implications for his mature theodicy. In this essay, it is shown that based on an analysis of a few key jurisprudential texts, the Nova Methodus (1666), the Elementa Juris Naturalis (1670–1671), and the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), Leibniz developed the legal term ‘obligatio’ from Roman Law and the Spanish Jesuit traditions, but that his usage shifted at different stages of his life. Nevertheless, these views are compatible and provide a grounding for his philosophical optimism. It is further shown that Leibniz took the concept of obligatio to provide something like legal standing (locus standi or klagebefugnis) so that rational minds can undergo the theodicean project, that is, because God has obligations to substances, they can seek an explanation for their suffering from God. And because human reason is analogous to divine reason, according to Leibniz, God provides the explanation that the actual world is the best possible world. The goal, then, is to prove that we should take Leibniz’s insights into jurisprudence more seriously, at least in part, because they help to explain his philosophical optimism.
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