Affiliation:
1. Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia
Abstract
Karl Friston’s free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, ‘wishful’. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli’s oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.
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