Knowledge Transfer within Enterprises from the Perspective of Innovation Quality Management: A Decision Analysis Based on the Stackelberg Game

Abstract

It is of great significance to study the effectiveness of knowledge transfer between the new and the veteran employees within enterprises for promoting sustainable innovation from the perspective of innovation quality management. However, few studies have examined the impact of innovation quality on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer between the new and veteran employees. In addition, knowledge of how reward and punishment incentives affect the effectiveness of knowledge transfer in innovation quality management remains insufficient. Since the amount of knowledge transfer is an important aspect of the effectiveness of knowledge transfer, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model with an innovation-quality-oriented threshold of the knowledge transfer amount and investigates the amount of knowledge transfer between new and veteran employees in the collaborative innovation of research and development (R&D) projects within enterprises. A case study was used to reveal that the innovation-quality-oriented threshold for the knowledge transfer amount can effectively promote the amount of knowledge transfer between the new and the veteran employees in collaborative innovation. Moreover, reward is more effective than punishment in promoting the amount of knowledge transfer to exceed the innovation-quality-oriented threshold. This study enriches the theories of knowledge transfer games under quality management. By virtue of end-to-end project management strategies, modern multimedia technologies, and reward incentives this study can be used to conduct quality control during project execution, to promote knowledge retention in R&D projects, the innovation quality of projects, and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The research methodology employed in this paper was limited to a case study, and the data utilized are not empirical data.