Cooperation Dynamic through Individualistic Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism in a Multi-Dynamic Model

Abstract

This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund’s indirect reciprocity model focused on agents’ individualism, which means that an agent strengthens its profile to the extent to which it makes a profit; this is using agent-based modeling. In addition, our model includes environmentally related conditions such as visibility and cooperative demand and internal poses such as obstinacy. The simulation results show that cooperators appear in a more significant proportion with conditions of low reputation visibility and high cooperative demand. Still, severe defectors take advantage of this situation and exceed the cooperators’ ratio. Some events show a heterogeneous society only with conditions of high obstinacy and cooperative demand. In general, the simulations show diverse scenarios, including centralized, polarized, and mixed societies. Simulation results show no healthy cooperation in indirect reciprocity due to individualism.