Refining the Rent Dissipation Model in Land Use: Application to Agricultural Insurance in China

Abstract

Despite apparent efficiency concerns, the use of agricultural insurance as a policy tool has surged in rural China. Its use offers a natural experiment to assess both economic theory of property rights and agricultural policy effectiveness, and to revisit the rent dissipation model that was originally developed to explain the role of property rights in unsustainable fisheries harvest decisions. We focus on evidence of resource overpricing behavior in the context of subsidized agricultural insurance, including evidence of a theoretically-expected increasing rent pattern. Our results reinforce the importance of transactions costs as a driver of economic inefficiency and highlight the role of social costs as an important factor to explicitly consider when designing agricultural policy. In particular, when employing the formal policy mechanism of rural agricultural insurance, we suggest that informal risk-bearing arrangements can be leveraged to reduce social costs behind apparent overpricing behavior and increase land users’ welfare consistent with intended policy goals.