Research on the Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology among Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Cost Sharing and Market Competition

Author:

Zou Yijing12,He Dayi12ORCID,Sun Rui12

Affiliation:

1. School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences, Beijing 100083, China

2. Key Laboratory of Carrying Capacity Assessment for Resource and Environment, Ministry of Natural Resources, Beijing 100083, China

Abstract

Supply chain green technology collaborative innovation is an important means for enterprises to improve the greenness of their products. This paper takes supply chain green technology innovation collaboration as the research object and constructs a stochastic differential game model, which not only provides reference for enterprises to choose the optimal type of technology innovation by combining with their own characteristics, but also provides a reference for their innovation decision-making in different market competition environments. The study shows the following: (1) in green product innovation, the formation of the cost-sharing contract is less affected by the intensity of competition in the green market when the market preference for greenness is relatively low. Therefore, government subsidies become an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. As market competition intensifies, manufacturers’ incentives to suppliers will shift from reducing costs to increasing demand. (2) In green process innovation, when the intensity of green competition is low and suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is high, manufacturers should bear more costs; when the market preference for greenness is low, the market competition is intense, and the suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is low, the suppliers should bear more costs to help the manufacturers gain more market shares. (3) When retailers’ preference for greenness is relatively low, the government subsidy becomes an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. (4) When the retailer’s green promotion performance is higher than the manufacturer’s, the manufacturer should bear more green promotion costs; conversely, the retailer should bear more green promotion costs. (5) Over time, the marginal increase in price over the marginal increase in greenness helps stabilise price volatility, considering consumer preferences. Conversely, it helps to increase the average value of prices.

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

MDPI AG

Reference47 articles.

1. Differential game study of green supply chain based on green technology innovation and manufacturer competition;Liu;Chin. J. Manag.,2023

2. Pricing and green level decisions of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties;Yang;J. Clean. Prod.,2017

3. External knowledge sources, green innovation and performance;Arfi;Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang.,2018

4. A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures;Ghosh;Int. J. Prod. Econ.,2012

5. Achillas, C., Bochtis, D.D., Aidonis, D., and Folinas, D. (2018). Green Supply Chain Management, Routledge.

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3