Dynamic Carbon-Constrained EPEC Model for Strategic Generation Investment Incentives with the Aim of Reducing CO2 Emissions

Abstract

According to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, energy system planners are encouraged to consider the effects of greenhouse gases such as CO 2 in their short-term and long-term planning. A decrease in the carbon emissions produced by the power plant will result in a tax decrease. In view of this, the Dynamic carbon-constrained Equilibrium programming equilibrium constraints (DCC-EPEC) Framework is suggested to explore the effects of distinct market models on generation development planning (GEP) on electricity markets over a multi-period horizon. The investment incentives included in our model are the firm contract and capacity payment. The investment issue, which is regarded as a set of dominant producers in the oligopolistic market, is developed as an EPEC optimization problem to reduce carbon emissions. In the suggested DCC-EPEC model, the sum of the carbon emission tax and true social welfare are assumed as the objective function. Investment decisions and the strategic behavior of producers are included at the first level so as to maximize the overall profit of the investor over the scheduling period. The second-level issue is market-clearing, which is resolved by an independent system operator (ISO) to maximize social welfare. A real power network, as a case study, is provided to assess the suggested carbon-constrained EPEC framework. Simulations indicate that firm contracts and capacity payments can initiate the capacity expansion of different technologies to improve the long-term stability of the electricity market.