Palmprint False Acceptance Attack with a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)

Abstract

Biometric-based authentication is widely deployed on multimedia systems currently; however, biometric systems are vulnerable to image-level attacks for impersonation. Reconstruction attack (RA) and presentation attack (PA) are two typical instances for image-level attacks. In RA, the reconstructed images often have insufficient naturalness due to the presence of remarkable counterfeit appearance, thus their forgeries can be easily detected by machine or human. The PA requires genuine users’ original images, which are difficult to acquire in practice and to counterfeit fake biometric images on spoofing carriers. In this paper, we develop false acceptance attack (FAA) for a palmprint biometric, which overcomes the aforementioned problems of RA and PA. FAA does not require genuine users’ images, and it can be launched simply with the synthetic images with high naturalness, which are generated by the generative adversarial networks. As a case study, we demonstrate the feasibility of FAA against coding-based palmprint biometric systems. To further improve the efficiency of FAA, we employ a clustering method to select diverse fake images in order to enhance the diversity of the fake images used, so the number of attack times is reduced. Our experimental results show the success rate and effectiveness of the FAA.