Abstract
Online reviews mitigate uncertainty about product quality that is caused by information asymmetry. However, low-quality online reviews are not effective, while high-quality online reviews may raise costs. Unlike the previous studies, this paper develops a game-theoretic model to examine the feasibility and pricing of online review supervision mechanism for operators of platforms that are based on the ‘network externality’. The results reveal that platforms are not always benefited from online reviews. We provide a new perspective and give some preventive suggestions for platforms with a view to furthering sustainable development.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development
Cited by
6 articles.
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