A Game-Theoretic Approach to Solve Competition between Multi-Type Electric Vehicle Charging and Parking Facilities

Abstract

This paper investigates the competition problem between electric vehicle charging and parking desks for different owners using a non-cooperative Bertrand game. There is growing attention on electric vehicles from both policy makers and the public charging service provider, as well as the electric vehicle owners. The interaction between different entities forms a competition (game), especially between multi-type electric vehicle charging and parking facilities. Most of the existing studies on charging platforms are about the optimization of the charging platform scheduling strategy or the game relationship between charging platforms and EV users, but there is a lack of exploration on the revenue game between charging platforms. In this paper, the competitive interactions between different charging decks are studied and analyzed using a general game-theoretic framework, specifically the Nikaido–Isoda solution. In the pricing competition model, the pricing strategies of all players and physical constraints, such as distribution line capacity, are taken into consideration. Through the case studies, it is clearly indicated that the game played between different electric vehicle charging/parking decks will always converge to a Nash equilibrium point. Both charging service providers and customers could benefit from such an open and fully competitive energy service ecosystem, which enhances the overall social welfare.