Affiliation:
1. College of Business Administration, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China
2. Business School, Southwest University of Political Science & Law, Chongqing 401120, China
Abstract
With the release of the national energy-saving emission reduction policy and the improvement of consumers’ awareness of environmental protection, the demand for low-carbon products is growing rapidly. In a retailer-led low-carbon supply chain, the increased cost of carbon emission reduction puts manufacturers at a disadvantage. Under the carbon quota policy, to improve manufacturers’ profits as well as enhance carbon emission reduction, this paper studies the players’ decisions in a low-carbon supply chain consisting of one dominant retailer and one manufacturer. To maintain the supply chain’s stability and sustainability, the dominant retailer tends to employ altruistic preference policies towards the manufacturer. The optimal decision, carbon emission reduction and supply chain profit are compared and analyzed under three decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without altruistic preference and (iii) decentralized decision with altruistic preference. The results indicate that the carbon emission reduction rate, market demand and profit in the centralized model are higher than in the decentralized model. The retailer’s altruistic preference is beneficial to the improvement of carbon emission reduction, market demand and the profit of the manufacturer and the supply chain. Under certain conditions, carbon trading can effectively reduce the cost pressure of manufacturers and improve the level of carbon emission reduction and the overall profit of the supply chain. These results will guide low-carbon supply chain decision-making and provide insight into the research of irrational behaviors in supply chain decision-making under carbon policies.
Funder
Chongqing Social Sciences Project
Subject
General Mathematics,Engineering (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Cited by
5 articles.
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