The Paradox of Privatization in Inland Fisheries Management: Lessons from a Traditional System

Abstract

Privatization, often proposed as a means to regulate natural resource use, sometimes paradoxically leads to overexploitation and social exclusion. Within the unique context of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) Regency, Indonesia, the privatization of swamp floodplains and rivers via the “Lelang Lebak, Lebung, Sungai” (L3S) system is a testament to this dilemma. L3S grants auction winners exclusive rights to fish, thereby privatizing common-pool resources. This study delves into the intricacies of the L3S mechanism, highlighting its significance in guiding inland fisheries’ management. Through stakeholder analysis, we pinpoint the crucial actors, as well as their interests, influence, and interrelationships. Our investigation revealed 20 distinct stakeholders, each playing different roles within the L3S framework. Based on their influence and vested interests, these stakeholders are categorized as key players, subjects, context setters, and crowds. This classification aids in discerning potential conflicts, cooperation, and synergies. Effective L3S execution hinges on collaboration, especially with pivotal entities such as fishery services, village and district heads, and village-owned enterprises. Insights gathered during the study indicate that while privatization has streamlined resource distribution, it intensifies overfishing and deepens socioeconomic divisions. This study calls for a harmonious blend of historical insights and modern governance, with a central focus on stakeholder collaboration and community involvement.