Payment for Environment Services to Promote Compliance with Brazil’s Forest Code: The Case of “Produtores de Água e Floresta”

Abstract

Payments for ecosystems services (PES) can promote natural resource conservation by increasing compliance with environmental laws. Law enforcement and PES proponents assume that individuals make decisions about compliance based on expectations of gains, likelihood of being caught in non-compliance, and magnitude of sanctions. Brazil’s Forest Code, characterized by low levels of compliance, includes incentive and disincentive mechanisms. We interviewed landowners in the Atlantic Forest to understand their motivations to participate (or not) in a PES project, the effects of knowledge and perceptions of environmental regulations on compliance, and how both environmental regulations and PES affect land management decision-making. We found that neither expectations of financial gains nor PES payments drive behavioral change and that the perception of systemic corruption reduced compliance with environment regulations. There were important behavioral differences between long-term residents for whom the land is their main source of income and recent residents with little dependence on land-generated income.