Affiliation:
1. Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
2. Research Center for Corporate Governance and Enterprise Development, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Abstract
The era of big data has changed the traditional data science based on mathematical statistics, and promoted the innovation of data analysis methods. This paper takes China state-holding holding enterprises as the research object, uses game theory as the method, uses top management team (TMT) knowledge hiding degree as the background to construct a minority shareholder governance information database, and discusses the feasibility of using minority shareholders’ active governance to break through and increase earnings management costs. The findings indicate, firstly, by optimizing enterprise information disclosure and reducing TMT knowledge hiding, the cost of minority shareholders’ participation in governance can be reduced and the enthusiasm of minority shareholders’ participation in governance can be promoted. Secondly, the presence of minority shareholders actively engaged in corporate governance can discourage two kinds of earnings management practices of managers in China state-holding enterprises. Finally, for the companies with weak state-holding and unannounced dividend policy, the active governance of minority shareholders has a more prominent restraining effect on the two types of earnings management. With an eye on strengthening the corporate micro-governance mechanism, this paper provides guidance for minority shareholders to strengthen their participation in the governance of China’s state-holding enterprises.
Funder
National Social Science Foundation of China
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development,Building and Construction