Do Publicly Listed Insurance Firms in Saudi Arabia Have Strong Corporate Governance?

Abstract

Saudi Arabia has now opened its markets to foreign investors in line with its strategy to diversify its economy. However, investors need to feel confident that Saudi enterprises are being monitored and regulated appropriately. This study identifies the impact of improvements in Saudi corporate governance practices among insurance firms. The effects of corporate governance on the financial performance of 35 insurance firms listed on the Saudi stock market are examined from 2008 to 2014, including Shariah-compliant and life insurance firms. Four different methodologies are used: the generalised least squares random effect, fixed effect models, a difference-in-differences (DID) measurement for comparisons, and the probit model with average marginal effect to address endogeneity. The results indicate that firm performance is affected by information asymmetry. The 2009 exogenous shock from the Saudi regulatory change to board composition and audit committee size shows a positive effect on performance in the DID comparison. However, an increase in independent board and audit committee members has a significant negative effect. Other findings indicate that an increase in CEO (Chief Executive Officer) age has a positive effect on performance, as do three pay variables (director incentives, CEO and top executive pay, and above-the-mean director incentives). However, when CEO and top executive pay increases above the mean, the effect turns negative; this also happens with a change in CEO from poor performance. The results support the importance of Saudi insurance industry corporate governance regulation and reflect the improved governance perspectives of the Saudi Capital Market Authority and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.