Refinements and Extensions of Ziv’s Model of Perfect Secrecy for Individual Sequences

Abstract

We refine and extend Ziv’s model and results regarding perfectly secure encryption of individual sequences. According to this model, the encrypter and the legitimate decrypter share a common secret key that is not shared with the unauthorized eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is aware of the encryption scheme and has some prior knowledge concerning the individual plaintext source sequence. This prior knowledge, combined with the cryptogram, is harnessed by the eavesdropper, who implements a finite-state machine as a mechanism for accepting or rejecting attempted guesses of the plaintext source. The encryption is considered perfectly secure if the cryptogram does not provide any new information to the eavesdropper that may enhance their knowledge concerning the plaintext beyond their prior knowledge. Ziv has shown that the key rate needed for perfect secrecy is essentially lower bounded by the finite-state compressibility of the plaintext sequence, a bound that is clearly asymptotically attained through Lempel–Ziv compression followed by one-time pad encryption. In this work, we consider some more general classes of finite-state eavesdroppers and derive the respective lower bounds on the key rates needed for perfect secrecy. These bounds are tighter and more refined than Ziv’s bound, and they are attained using encryption schemes that are based on different universal lossless compression schemes. We also extend our findings to the case where side information is available to the eavesdropper and the legitimate decrypter but may or may not be available to the encrypter.