Localization of GNSS Spoofing Interference Source Based on a Moving Array Antenna

Abstract

GNSS spoofing interference utilizes falsified navigation signals to launch attacks on GNSS systems, posing a significant threat to applications that rely on GNSS signals for positioning, navigation, and time services. Therefore, achieving effective localization of the sources causing spoofing interference is crucial in ensuring the secure operation of GNSS. This article proposes a method for locating GNSS spoofing interference sources using a moving array antenna. Firstly, the proposed method utilizes the inherent characteristics of the double-differenced carrier phase from the deception signals received by the array antenna to effectively extract the spoofing signals. Subsequently, by moving the antenna array, the original carrier phase single-difference data of multiple observation points for deception signals are fused to provide a cost function for direct localization of spoofing interference, and a solution method for the cost function is designed. The proposed method addresses the challenge of extracting and localizing GNSS spoofing interference weak signals, effectively avoiding the data correlation of traditional two-step methods for DOA estimation parameters and ensuring the location accuracy of spoofing interference and the robustness of the method. The effectiveness of the proposed method has been validated through simulation experiments, and its adaptability to factors such as errors in carrier phase measurements has been examined. The method exhibits strong applicability and is well-suited for the hardware platform of the GNSS nulling antenna, thereby enabling it to possess simultaneous capabilities in both anti-interference and spoofing interference localization.