Author:
Li Fang,Wu Feng-ping,Chen Liu-xin,Zhao Yue,Chen Xiang-nan,Shao Zhi-ying
Abstract
The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang–Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts.
Subject
Health, Toxicology and Mutagenesis,Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
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