Abstract
Since the concession period is one of the most crucial variables influencing the success of a photovoltaic (PV) power project under build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode, this paper presents a real option game model—which integrates the real option and cooperative game theory—to determine the optimal concession period of the BOT solar PV power project under policy incentives by considering the value of the option to defer. In the proposed model, an effective interval of concession period for the BOT project was identified by using a real option, and the equilibrium value of the concession period was obtained by applying classical optimization theory. To evaluate our model, we empirically determined the optimal concession period for the BOT solar PV power project in China, and a sensitivity analysis was conducted to demonstrate how relevant influential factors, which are presented in the model, affect the equilibrium value of the concession period and its effective interval. The results indicate that the current investment environment in China could successfully implement the BOT solar PV power project under policy incentives, including initial cost subsidy and the feed-in tariffs mechanism. While the high volatility of electricity demand, investment cost, and land-use rent fee can lead the failure of the BOT solar PV project implementation, promoting the technological development of PV power generation, maintaining the market stability, and increasing the policy incentives can help the BOT power project to be arranged with an optimal concession period. In addition, the feed-in tariffs mechanism is more helpful than the initial cost subsidy for winning the BOT contract.
Funder
The Major Research Plan of National Social Science Fund of China
Subject
Energy (miscellaneous),Energy Engineering and Power Technology,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Control and Optimization,Engineering (miscellaneous)
Cited by
7 articles.
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