Robust Estimation Method against Poisoning Attacks for Key-Value Data with Local Differential Privacy

Abstract

Local differential privacy (LDP) protects user information from potential threats by randomizing data on individual devices before transmission to untrusted collectors. This method enables collectors to derive user statistics by analyzing randomized data, thereby presenting a promising avenue for privacy-preserving data collection. In the context of key–value data, in which discrete and continuous values coexist, PrivKV has been introduced as an LDP protocol to ensure secure collection. However, this framework is susceptible to poisoning attacks. To address this vulnerability, we propose an expectation maximization (EM)-based algorithm combined with a cryptographic protocol to facilitate secure random sampling. Our LDP protocol, known as emPrivKV, exhibits two key advantages: it improves the accuracy of statistical information estimation from randomized data, and enhances resilience against the manipulation of statistics, that is, poisoning attacks. These attacks involve malicious users manipulating the analysis results without detection. This study presents the empirical results of applying the emPrivKV protocol to both synthetic and open datasets, highlighting a notable improvement in the precision of statistical value estimation and robustness against poisoning attacks. As a result, emPrivKV improved the frequency and the mean gains by 17.1% and 25.9%, respectively, compared to PrivKV, with the number of fake users being 0.1 of the genuine users. Our findings contribute to the ongoing discourse on refining LDP protocols for key–value data in scenarios involving privacy-sensitive information.