The Creator/Creature Distinction in Debates over Models of God

Abstract

In contemporary theology, one can find an array of models of God to choose from. There are various types of arguments that one can put forth in order to reject one model, or to defend another model. In this paper, I wish to examine one popular type of argument. This argument typically says that one should reject a model of God that blurs the creator/creature distinction. The problem with this kind of argument is that it usually begs the question by presupposing one’s own model of God in the creator/creature distinction. In other words, the argument basically boils down to, ‘I reject your model of God because it is not my preferred model of God.’ On many other occasions, the arguments beg the question by confusing additional metaphysical doctrines with the concepts of creator and creature. In this paper, I shall examine several different versions of the creator/creature distinction argument in an effort to find a version that is not question begging. I shall begin with articulating what I take to be the basics of a Christian understanding of the creator/creature distinction. Then, I shall consider several recent attempts from classical theists to argue that a rival model of God violates the creator/creature distinction. In each case, I shall find the arguments wanting. First, I shall examine James E. Dolezal’s attempt to argue that non-classical models of God violate the creator/creature distinction. I will argue that Dolezal’s attempt is question begging because it sneaks in his own model of God and several questionable metaphysical assumptions into the concepts of creator and creature, and thus goes beyond the basic creator/creature distinction without justification. Second, I shall examine a recent attempt by Kevin J. Vanhoozer to argue that Thomas J. Oord’s panentheistic model of God violates the creator/creature distinction. I will argue that Vanhoozer’s attempt suffers from several conceptual errors.