How Does the Government Policy Combination Prevents Greenwashing in Green Building Projects? An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Abstract

Green buildings (GBs) can effectively reduce building energy consumption and alleviate energy problems. However, as green building projects swell, the development process of GBs in China has gradually exposed many problems, among which the greenwashing behavior of construction enterprises is the more serious. The government needs to adopt some appropriate policies to prevent problems in GBs. This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to construct models and proposes four policy combinations: static reward and static punishment, static reward and dynamic punishment, dynamic reward and static punishment, dynamic reward and dynamic punishment. We compare the impact of four combinations on construction strategy and analyze the inner mechanisms of the behavior evolution of government departments and construction enterprises. Our results revealed no evolutionary stabilization strategy in the game system under the static reward and punishment policy. Under the combination of dynamic subsidies and static penalty policy, the green construction effect of construction enterprises is the best. Furthermore, dynamic reward policy has a more obvious restraining effect on construction enterprises. The government should dynamically adjust rewards and punishments according to the construction quality and determine the appropriate upper limit of rewards and punishments to improve the policies’ applicability and effectiveness. This study provides theoretical support for the healthy development of green buildings.