Evolutionary Game Analysis on Cooperative Behavior of Major Projects’ Technology Innovation Subjects under General Contracting Mode

Abstract

Major projects are the important platform for enhancing a country’s comprehensive national power and strengthening its capacity for independent innovation. Although major projects in China have made remarkable achievements, willingness to cooperate and innovate has not achieved the desired target. In this paper, the evolutionary game model of cooperative innovation behavior of general contractors and subcontractors is constructed by considering reputational factors. Through theoretical derivation, the influence of the distribution ratio of collaborative innovation benefit, spillover technology absorption capacity, and reputation discounting coefficient on innovation behavior is analyzed. Finally, MATLAB software is used to simulate the dynamic evolution process of strategy selection. The results show that (1) a reasonable benefit distribution coefficient can promote the evolution of innovation behavior in a positive direction; (2) both the reduction of innovation cost and the increase of spillover technology absorption capacity can make the innovation subject more inclined to choose the active collaborative innovation strategy; and (3) it is the higher-than-threshold reputation loss that can effectively inhibit the “free-rider” behavior. The research conclusions and managerial implications can provide reference for improving the willingness to cooperate in major projects’ technology innovation.