Creating an Efficient Public–Private Partnership Bundle: An Empirical Study

Abstract

Public–Private Partnerships have been implemented globally as a key procurement strategy for addressing the issue of funding gaps amidst the immense pressure to deliver new major infrastructure projects. However, in current practice, procurement selection is applied to the entire bundle of project activities. This often leads to unduly large bundles of externalized project activities that create unduly large PPP contracts and attempt to transfer too much risk. To address this gap, this paper presents the development and testing of an implementable model that embodies a range of microeconomic theories—namely, transaction cost and resource-based theories—and property rights theory. This paper presents the first empirical testing of this model based on two road and two health projects, using competition as an independent measure of the validity of the recommended procurement strategy. The results provide compelling evidence that a rigorous application of the model will enable a substantial improvement of existing procurement approaches, such as identifying the most suitable bundle to be procured using a PPP approach.