The Cooperative Game Study of Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in the Construction of Green Ports

Abstract

With the development of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) in green ports, a series of conflicts and contradictions among the participating parties have emerged, which in turn affect and hinder the process of project construction. This paper analyzes the current situation of Chinese ODI in green ports, constructs a cooperative game model between Chinese port investment enterprises and the host government with introduces the effort level, and selects three actual green port projects for calculation and analysis to show that Chinese ODI in green ports can bring economic and environmental benefits to both parties. It is found that the expected revenues and effort levels of both the Chinese port enterprises and the host government are positively correlated with each other’s effort levels, and there exists an optimal effort level and an optimal investment amount of the Chinese port enterprises to maximize the benefits obtained by both parties in the green port project. At the same time, the cases studied find that the benefits obtained by the host government are higher; Therefore, Chinese port investment enterprises can promote green ports projects by finding their own optimal effort level. Additionally, active cooperation is the optimal choice of the host government.