Managerial Myopia and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from China

Abstract

A corporation’s ability to uphold valuable long-term investments is a critical component of the business’s sustainability. Combining the views of the upper echelons theory and agency theory, this study argues that myopic managerial behavior is detrimental to a firm’s long-term investment. We construct an indicator assessing managerial myopia based on the textual analysis approach. The moderating effect analysis suggested that the negative impact of managerial myopia on long-term investments is lessened with an increase in institutional investor ownership and analyst coverage. In addition, we found that managerial myopia negatively correlates with capital expenditures and R&D investments. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis suggested that the correlation between managerial myopia and long-term investment is stronger among firms with higher industry competition, poor performance levels, and in non-state-owned enterprises.