Abstract
The paper analyzes a two-stage oligopoly game of semi-collusion in production described by a system with a symmetric structure. We examine the local stability of a Nash equilibrium and the presence of bifurcations. We discover that the model is capable of exhibiting extremely complicated dynamic behaviors.
Subject
Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous),General Mathematics,Chemistry (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
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