The Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Green Agro-Product Supply in an Agricultural Industrialization Consortium

Abstract

In recent years, China has actively promoted the green transformation and low-carbon development of agriculture. New-type agricultural business entities such as family farms, specialized cooperatives and agro-processing enterprises have become important vehicles of agricultural green transformation due to their comparative advantages in multiple aspects. Within the agricultural industrialization consortium, the motivation of new-type agricultural business entities to synergistically implement the agricultural green transformation strategy is affected by bounded rationality as well as multiple economic and social factors. Clarifying the mechanism of the above factors would be of benefit to promoting agricultural green transformation in developing countries. In this article, a tripartite evolutionary game model about the production and sale of green agro-products is constructed, and the influences of various factors on the evolutionary game process are analyzed, based on new institutional economics and new economic sociology. According to the simulation results, it is found that the proportional quality contributions of the agents, the intensification of consumers’ preference for green agro-products and the increase of social embedding cost are conducive to the system converging to the favorable evolutionary equilibrium at a faster rate. However, the increases of marginal costs, market risks and spillover effects would prevent the system from converging to the favorable evolutionary equilibrium. Accordingly, corresponding suggestions are put forward to support the effective supply of green agricultural products in the agricultural industrialization consortium.