Abstract
The bidding price is one of the important factors for construction enterprises in winning a bid. In the context of public bidding in the construction industry, in the process of group competition, how to estimate the individual bids to calculate their maximum value and the best price to improve the winning probability has become an important issue. In this research, based on the real option theory, the concept of group bidding environment is introduced to establish a real option price decision-making model for construction projects. The function of the model covers two external competitive environments: independent and coupled. Finally, through model inspection and parameter sensitivity analysis, the model is discussed in depth, and suggestions for model application are obtained. The research results show that the rule of the model results has optimization characteristics, and the numerical solution is consistent with the analytical solution, which has a certain price guidance role. In the independent bidding environment, their optimal bidding price is inversely proportional to the volatility level and the option period, and it is directly proportional to the estimated costs but has no obvious relationship with the number of competitors. Moreover, the average sensitivity of the optimal bidding price to the estimated costs, the volatility level and the option period are 35.06%, 9.77% and 7.70%, respectively; the optimal mark-up ratio is 1.078. In the coupled bidding environment, the concentration of competitors’ prices and the optimal price will increase significantly, by about 2.37%, and the corresponding winning probability and weighted option value will increase by about 9.36% and 28.03%, respectively. The research results can provide price optimization for bidding activities with real option characteristics and improve the price winning rate, but the selection of price mode and parameter setting need to be set by enterprises according to industry characteristics and actual conditions.
Subject
Fluid Flow and Transfer Processes,Computer Science Applications,Process Chemistry and Technology,General Engineering,Instrumentation,General Materials Science
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