Mechanism and Algorithm for Stable Trading Matching between Coal Mining and Power Generation Companies in China

Abstract

This paper is concerned with stable trading between the coal mining and power generation companies in China. Under the current marketized coal and planned electricity price systems, barriers to price shifting between coal and electricity are created and conflicts between the two sectors are aggravated. The stable trading matching between coal mining and power generation companies is not only an effective means to resolve the conflict in the coal trading market, but also a ballast stone for price stabilization and supply guarantees in coal trading. Based on the two-sided matching theory, this paper starts from the micro market preference and matching willingness of coal mining and power generation companies, puts forward the conceptual framework of the pairwise stable matching of both sides, innovates a mechanism for trading between coal mining and power generation companies, and designs a stable trading matching algorithm. The algorithm has certain theoretical innovation significance from the matching problem of non-separable commodities to that of separable commodities considering the trading volume between coal mining and power generation companies. Furthermore, it is a complement and perfection of the existing coal–power trading platform in its transaction mechanism and trading function. The results reveal that the trading relations between coal mining and power generation companies under the stable matching mechanism are resistant to disintegration and that the pairwise stable matching result is sensitive.